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Introduction In 2013, Dr. J. Muizelaar and Dr. R. Schrot, two neurosurgeons at the University of California Davis Medical Center (UCDMC), were found guilty of research misconduct due to failure to comply with institutional policies as well as Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations governing human subjects research.  At issue here, however, is the difference between research and innovative therapy in the clinical setting of patient care where clinical judgment is reasonably to be privileged. Methods The UCDMC investigative document is reviewed along with standard literature on clinical ethics and clinical data about glioblastoma multiforme (GBM) cancer. Results In this paper I argue that, by tendentiously focusing on policies, regulations, and procedures governing human subjects research, the UCDMC investigation failed to account for the centrality of clinical judgment and clinical ethics pertinent to judicious review of this matter, especially given the unique clinical context of terminally ill patients having exhausted standard care treatment options for glioblastoma multiforme (GBM) cancer. Conclusions The UCDMC investigation raises serious problems for clinicians who are engaged in innovative therapy in the clinical setting, requiring a regulatory framework separate from the normal Institutional Review Board (IRB) process.

Introduction En 2013, le Dr J. Muizelaar et le Dr R. Schrot, deux neurochirurgiens du Centre médical Davis de l'Université de Californie (UCDMC), ont été reconnus coupables d'inconduite en matière de recherche en raison du non-respect des politiques institutionnelles ainsi que de Food and Drug Administration (FDA) régissant la recherche sur les sujets humains. Il s'agit ici de la différence entre la recherche et la thérapie novatrice dans le contexte clinique des soins aux patients où le jugement clinique est raisonnablement privilégié. Méthodes Le document d'enquête de l'UCDMC est revu avec la littérature standard sur l'éthique clinique et les données cliniques concernant le cancer du glioblastome multiforme (GBM). Résultats Dans cet article, je soutiens que, en se concentrant de façon tendancieuse sur les politiques, les règlements et les procédures régissant la recherche sur les sujets humains, l'enquête UCDMC n'a pas tenu compte de la centralité du jugement clinique et de l'éthique clinique pertinente à une analyse judicieuse de cette question, Clinique des patients en phase terminale ayant épuisé les options de traitement de soins standard pour le cancer du glioblastome multiforme (GBM). Conclusions L'enquête UCDMC soulève de sérieux problèmes pour les cliniciens qui sont engagés dans une thérapie innovatrice dans le cadre clinique, nécessitant un cadre réglementaire distinct du processus normal de l'IRB (Institutional Review Board).
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Introduction: Case Background
Glioblastoma multiform (GBM) is characterized as “the most common and deadliest of malignant primary brain tumors in adults,” a fact that is salient to a physician’s clinical judgment as to options in therapeutic intervention and a given patient’s prognosis. (National Brain Tumor Society; no date)  Beginning in 2010, Dr. J. Paul Muizelaar was attending neurosurgeon at the University of California Davis Medical Center, treating three patients (consecutively) who were suffering from advanced stages of GBM, an evidently fatal disease reported to have “a median survival of 15 months after first diagnosis.”  According to the American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS), GBM is “the most invasive type” of glioma, occurring in adults “most often in the cerebral hemispheres, especially in the frontal (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Frontal_lobe" \t "_blank​) and temporal lobes of the brain,” hence the severe prognosis for survival and cognitive function. (American Association of Neurological Surgeons, 2012) Treatment normally requires surgery to remove as much of the brain tumor as feasible (allowing for cell remnants, therefore with a probability of recurrent tumor growth), to be followed by “six weeks of daily brain radiation, which in and by itself causes considerable damage in otherwise healthy brain, followed by multiple courses of chemotherapy (Temodar).” (Muizelaar, Statement, 2013) AANS comments that, “traditional methods of treatment are unlikely to result in a prolonged remission (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Remission_(medicine)" \l "Remission" \t "_blank​) of GBM tumors;” hence, for cases of GBM in the USA in 2012, the AANS estimated a 57% case mortality.
Dr. Muizelaar and Dr. Rudolph J. Schrot (an associate neurosurgeon) made clinical decisions in their treatment of three patients suffering from GBM, raising questions internal to UCDMC whether their therapeutic approach was appropriate in the context of a terminal illness where the standard care treatments were exhausted and an option of “innovative” care was then to be considered and delivered.  The latter procedure involved deliberate introduction of a wound infection at the surgical site through the use of a locally prepared bacterium, Enterobacter aerogenes. This was designed (on the basis of some empirical evidence) to generate an immune response that would then supposedly suppress tumorigenesis and, hopefully, improve the given patient’s survival prognosis.  This procedure will be discussed below in context of the UCDMC internal investigations that ensued following the deaths of the three patients.
Investigations into alleged faculty misconduct involving Dr. J. Paul Muizelaar and Dr. Rudolph J. Schrot, neurosurgeons at the University of California Davis Medical Center (UCDMC), concluded in 2013 with an issued final report and the consequent resignation of both physicians from the UCDMC faculty. (Cohen and Rourke, 2013; Ikemoto, 2013) The Provost’s Review Panel recommended “more rigorous oversight of clinical research and increased attention to supporting a culture of compliance at the health systems campus and throughout the research enterprise.” (Cohen, 2013, p. 1) This panel was concerned with review of extant procedures and the process of internal decision-making at UCDMC, rather than with investigative discovery of scientific or clinical misconduct in the case of the two neurosurgeons. The latter was the charge of Ms. Lisa Ikemoto (professor at UCD School of Law with interests in bioethics and health care law), who delivered a separate report, also to be discussed here later in terms of what is at issue: whether the two neurosurgeons were properly to be found guilty of violating standards of research involving human subjects or, alternatively, whether they were reasonably to be judged involved in innovative medical care, in which case clinical judgment is pertinent to the deliberative outcome.
Let us consider the findings from the Provost’s Review Panel and then those of Professor Ikemoto.
The Provost’s Review Panel found that:
1.	The Institutional Review Board (IRB) failed “to intervene sooner to prevent the non-compliant activities,” thus finding the two neurosurgeons responsible for non-compliance with reference to IRB policy and regulation governing human subjects research.
2.	“At the time of these events there was no formal process for informing the Medical Staff or Medical Center staff (perioperative services) about patients who were to receive innovative care….” (Cohen, 2013, p. 4)  The latter finding raised the pertinent question of what medical care is to be accounted “innovative” in the clinical setting, and what institutional processes and procedures should regulate this kind of care.
3.	The Vice Provost for Academic Personnel (after consultation with the campus legal counsel, the Health System counsel, and the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs of the School of Medicine) determined that, “the conduct primarily concerned clinical practice and as a result, the most appropriate venue for response was the Medical Staff Peer Review process.” (Cohen, 2013, p. 4; italics added)  This determination is important in terms of clarifying (a) what counts as an appropriate regulatory process for clinical care (thus involving medical staff peer review, including here the traditional “Grand Rounds” in which physicians present and invite collegial deliberation about “clinical judgment” involving therapeutic options), and (b) what processes are otherwise appropriate for clinical research (thus, e.g., involving committees such as Institutional Review Boards [IRBs] or other Bioethics Committees), despite the overlap that sometimes occurs in the clinical setting of major teaching hospitals.
And, indeed, the matter was initially reviewed through this process, rather than through a separate process of investigation for research misconduct under the terms of the institution’s Faculty Code of Conduct. The fact that there was a review according to this process is pertinent to understanding whether the actions taken by the two neurosurgeons constituted research on human subjects or, when assessed relative to standards of clinical judgment, was instead indeed non-standard innovative care for terminally ill patients.
A defensible claim that the two neurosurgeons were non-compliant with research policy depends on the veracity of the substantiated findings, according to which it would have to be established with reasonably sufficient evidence that Muizelaar and Schrot were engaged in research per se.  That said, the Panel clearly held that Muizelaar and Schrot were (1) guilty of research misconduct and were, in particular, (2) accountable for “misrepresentation of the research activities as clinical activities under the jurisdiction of the Medical Staff.” (Cohen, 2013, p. 7) This latter claim, however, is subject to examination, insofar as this assessment of the conduct of the two neurosurgeons shifts evaluation from standards of clinical judgment to standards applicable to human subjects research.  I will argue here that it is precisely this interpretive move that is questionable in this case., and questionable to the point that the interpretive approach taken by Professor Ikemoto was misplaced and led to an incorrect conclusion about Dr. Muizelaar’s actions in particular.
The Provost’s Review Panel and Professor Ikemoto’s Investigation
The Panel issued its recommendations based upon the investigative report issued by Professor Ikemoto.  She concluded, specifically (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 1):
1.	“Dr. Muizelaar violated the Faculty Code of Conduct, APM [Academic Personnel Manual] 015, by engaging in conduct that constitutes a serious violation of University research policies;”
2.	Dr. Muizelaar “failed to obtain the appropriate review and approvals required by UCD PPM [University of California Davis Policy and Procedure Manual] 240-50 and FDA [Food and Drug Administration] regulations;”
3.	“Dr. Schrot also failed to adhere to the University of California’s Standards of Ethical Conduct.” 
Ikemoto’s conclusions follow from her determination that the two neurosurgeons were engaged in human subjects research, despite their consistent claim that they were engaged in non-standard innovative care.  It is this dichotomy that is centrally at issue in the UCDMC investigation, but also pertinent to assessing regulatory implications of this investigation for physicians otherwise engaged in clinical practice and who are also involved in either human subjects research, i.e., phased clinical trials, or innovative medical care.  Obviously, there can be clinical research undertaken that is not that of a clinical trial; but, in this case, it is the regulatory language that is the reference for Professor Ikemoto, in which case it is this basis of analysis that is pertinent to the distinction to be made between clinical research and non-standard innovative care.
The UCDMC investigation highlighted ample concern about the inadequacy of internal communications and administrative procedures in this case, despite judgments that found both neurosurgeons guilty of reckless conduct in the care of the three patients suffering from GBM.  A reporter and editors of the Sacramento Bee newspaper followed and reported on the investigation regularly. For the newspaper’s editors, the neurosurgeons were guilty of having taken advantage of vulnerable patients.  They opined: “Basic rules that guide the ethical treatment of all patients cannot be waived for the most vulnerable, the terminally ill.” (Editorial, 2013) This opinion presupposes the research ethics classification of “vulnerable populations,” i.e., participants in research who are normally accorded special protections, especially in relation to the research criterion of voluntary, prior, explicit, informed consent to medical care.  But, the question here is whether such a taxonomical commitment is properly applicable in the case of the three patients suffering from GBM. Terminally ill patients are considered vulnerable, but even here clinical judgment relative to a specific patient remains a primary factor in decision-making concerning therapeutic options.
Notwithstanding UCDMC formulating and promulgating a new policy on innovative medical treatment as a way of preventing adverse situations such as occurred in this case, we are left with a broader unsettled ethical dispute about the operative differences between clinical research and innovative therapy.  No doubt, the conceptual and operative distinctions can relate to ethical judgment involving vulnerable patients in some cases.  But, in Muizelaar’s case, patients 1 and 2 who were terminally ill as a result of GBM had no remaining standard care option (surgery, radiation therapy, and chemotherapy), which explains (relative to diagnosis and prognosis) Muizelaar’s proposal for an innovative care option.  The UCDMC investigation’s outcome is problematic insofar as it suffers from inadequate attention to salient differences between research bioethics and clinical ethics applicable to assessment of this kind of case, and the weight of clinical ethics in particular in evaluating a physician’s conduct in the clinical setting.  Here I shall argue that reference to clinical ethics leads to a reasonably deliberative outcome different from that issued by Ikemoto; and, according to this deliberative outcome, Dr. Muizelaar would be reasonably absolved of the charge of scientific misconduct, whatever else the (confidential) internal medical peer review may have said about the appropriateness of the proposed medical care, especially in the case of Patient 3.  I will address the involvement of Dr. Schrot only insofar as it bears upon evaluation of Dr. Muizelaar, given that Dr. Schrot was not an assistant surgeon of record in the case of the patients at issue (despite faulty medical records that were, at the time of investigation, subject to correction of this fact).  Moreover, given that it was Dr. Schrot who undertook pre-clinical research in his capacity as a principal investigator, it is Schrot rather than Muizelaar whose actions may be more reasonably evaluated along the lines of the Ikemoto investigation.  This is an important point, so as to avoid an assessment of guilt by association, notwithstanding the usual conversations and consultations between the two neurosurgeons that would occur in the clinical setting.
A. Applicable Definitions of Research
Ikemoto cited the United States federal government definition of research as it is given in the Code of Federal Regulations [45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2009)]: “a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge…” Key to this definition is the characterization of research as a systematic investigation involving several phases or stages of development, testing, and evaluation. A “human subject” is defined by regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services as “a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains (1) Data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2) Identifiable private information.” [Id., at § 46.102(f)]  Again, central to this designation is a context of research such as defined above, such that the living individual is a participant in “human subjects research” per se that is formally governed by an approved protocol.  Further, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations define a “human subject” as “an individual who is or becomes a participant in research, either as a recipient of the test article or as a control.  A subject may be either a healthy individual or a patient.” [21 C.F.R. § 56.102(e)]  This latter definition includes patients who are first and foremost engaged by clinicians in the clinical setting as patients and who only secondarily are recruited and engaged in that setting as research subjects consequent to an approved protocol, hence the applicable concept of “clinical investigation.”
It is this interpretive approach that prejudices Ikemoto’s assessment and her conclusions.  By citing the UCD PPM Chapter 240 definition, Ikemoto understood the scope of the definition to include any patient “to whom the test article might offer a therapeutic benefit or provide diagnostic information or a better understanding of a disease or metabolic process.”  Further, if a product is used explicitly as an investigational drug (IND) or device, then under the UCD broad definition this activity is automatically identified as research.  Moreover, Ikemoto held, a “surgical procedure is considered to involve research” if “[t]he investigator wishes to develop a procedure that has not previously been performed,” or if “[t]he investigator wishes to study a procedure.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 10) Key to any application of this definition is an answer to the questions (1) who counts as an “investigator” and (2) how either intent or practice is accounted as “developing” or “studying” a procedure.  Hence, one would have to ascertain (1) was Dr. Muizelaar properly an investigator in the above sense and (2) was it Dr. Muizelaar’s intent to develop or study such a procedure.
Finally, the UCD PPM [Chapter 290, Health and Safety Services, Section 55, Biological Safety] “identifies the activities that require approval of a Biological Use Authorization (“BUA”) by the Biological Safety Administrative Advisory Committee (“BSAAC”).”  Ikemoto found that, “Such conduct requiring approval of a BUA by the BSAAC includes: ‘3. Research and other activities involving the use of microbial agents listed as Risk Group 2 or 3 (see NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL, fifth edition or later), the NIH Guidelines, or the UC Davis Biosafety Manual), or agents that are customarily handled at Biosafety Level 2 or 3 regardless of Risk Group.’”  Accordingly, Ikemoto opined, “Enterobacter aerogenes falls under Biosafety Level 2, according to the UCD Biosafety Manual, Appendix A.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 11)
The foregoing are the grounding definitions of research Ikemoto found applicable in assessing the conduct of the neurosurgeons in relation to the patients they treated for GBM.
B. Ambiguity in the Relevant Literature Guiding Muizelaar and Schrot
Muizelaar was attending physician in the case of the three patients he was treating for GBM.  Insofar as a neurosurgeon engages a particular patient, there are variables that must be assessed from the perspective of the neurosurgeon’s clinical judgment.  Oncology specialist Maurie Markman, for example, clarifies “the importance of a patient’s overall performance status in influencing the course of malignant disease” as this relates to the outcome of treatment. (Markman, 2001, pp. 337-378) Commenting on variables “associated with prognosis that can have a significant impact on outcome in cancer,” Markman reminds that the clinician has to account for these factors impacting on outcome “often quite independent of the specific antineoplastic treatment strategy employed.  [¶] These factors include patient age, stage of disease, tumor grade, location and number of metastatic sites, size of individual masses, total volume of disease, prior radiation or chemotherapy, and the presence of pre-existing comorbid medical conditions.”  All of this is pertinent to a clinician’s prognostication in the case of patients having recurrent GBM, all components of clinical judgment, including that of Dr. Muizelaar as attending physician.  Yet, there is nothing in the Ikemoto report that even suggests that the clinical dimension of Muizelaar’s/Schrot’s conduct was taken into account in sorting out the debated issue whether the two neurosurgeons were involved in human subjects research rather than innovative medical treatment.  Markman states elsewhere, "It is also relevant to note that when a physician elects to treat a patient with a specific management approach, based on particular clinical characteristics (eg, [an] existing comorbidity or a perceived greater risk of experiencing treatment-related toxicity), we will appropriately refer to this critically important professional activity as clinical judgment, but when this precise decision-making process is undertaken in the context of a clinical trial, we would label such an effort selection bias." (Markman, 2008, pp. 455-457) There is nothing in the clinical context of Muizelaar’s decision-making that suggests the research language normally engaged in a clinical trial was reasonably to be deployed, given the clinical decisions he was making at the time.  This bears upon assessment of Dr. Muizelaar’s intent—whether it was clinical research or non-standard innovative care.
No one doubts, of course, that, “Important trials are sometimes conducted by the proponents of a new therapy, who see the randomized trial as the most effective way to convince skeptics and thereby to improve patient care.  And it is certainly true that many if not most physicians who participate in randomized clinical trials—while not sure which treatment will turn out to be better—have a definite opinion.” (Royall, 1992, pp. 229-230) But, in this case it is absolutely essential to distinguish (a) clinical decision-making relative to a given patient in the setting of the hospital clinical encounter, and (b) engagement of a patient explicitly recruited as a participant in a randomized clinical trial according to protocol-defined criteria of inclusion and exclusion, thus to resolve any methodological issues associated with selection bias on the part of the researcher.  None of this latter discourse was present in the Muizelaar case.  Yet, this is the epistemological context pertinent to a judicious evaluation of Muizelaar’s conduct.  As Royall put it, “…Mayo Clinic investigators of combination chemotherapy apparently have treatment preferences that are not widely shared today [1992].  But do those preferences not represent competent medical judgments?  Competent professionals can disagree, and one’s judgment is not reduced to a mere hunch by the fact that a respected colleague has a different opinion…[Treatment] decisions have to be made, and each physician must treat his patients according to his own best professional judgment.” (Royall, 1992, p. 230)  Muizelaar by all standards of professional assessment counts as a competent physician, had his own opinions as to reasonable treatment regimens, and made his decisions about how he would treat the three patients according to his best professional judgment, notwithstanding any varied judgment that might have been presented in the internal medical peer review process.
Muizelaar and Schrot cited “several reports in the literature documenting many years of tumor-free survival after an accidental (non-intentional) wound infection, often with either Enterobacter or S. aureus.” (Muizelaar, Statement, 2013) Specifically, argued Muizelaar, “One could consider the expert’s opinions (Drs. Harold Young, Thomas Milhorat, Andy Fox, ourselves and many others) and case report (Bowles) class 4 and 3 evidence, with the two reports showing a survival benefit for patients with a wound infection (Bohman et al. on 382 patients, not statistically significant with a p value of .27, De Bonis et al. on 197 patients, p<.01, statistically significant) as class 2 evidence in favor of a wound infection in patients with malignant brain tumors.” (Muizelaar, Statement, 2013) Muizelaar furthermore commented on his own clinical experience, “one patient in the VA [Veterans Administration] who got an infection during surgery and then survived an additional 15 years;” another patient at UCD, “who experienced a wound infection when operated on in Japan, and survived an additional 20 years.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 42) While anecdotal, these notices are part of Muizelaar’s clinical experience and thus added to his clinical judgment as he evaluated therapeutic options for the three patients in his care.
Immunologists once understood the brain to be an immune privileged site (IPS), i.e., “the only elements protecting the CNS from immune-mediated harm was the presence of an intact blood-brain barrier (BBB) and the absence of an immune-competent population of tissue macrophages/tissue dendritic cells.” (Carson, et al., 2006, pp. 48-65)  However, “Current data indicate that the CNS is both immune competent and actively interactive with the peripheral immune system…[N]euroinflammation is now realized to have both neuroprotective and neurotoxic aspects.” (Carson, et al., 2006, pp. 48-65) Writing in 1983, Kapp reported on microorganisms as antineoplastic agents in central nervous system (CNS) tumors, stating: “Substantial evidence exists to indicate that microorganisms may, by growing in or near tumors, completely or partially inhibit tumor growth, or alternatively may have no effect at all. In fact, oncolysis may occur only when a specific organism infects a specific tumor.” (Kapp, 1983, pp. 637-642) Further, “Innate immune responses, most notably the recruitment and activation of peripheral and resident macrophages, are readily initiated within the CNS by bacterial components…” Also, “neutrophils are prominently recruited to the CNS in response to many insults…[e.g.] bacterial brain abscess.” (Carson, 2006) In 1999, Bowles and Perkin reported on long-term remission of patients after intracranial infection with Enterobacter aerogenes, concluding, “The case histories presented in conjunction with the relevant literature reviewed support the concept that microbial infections may influence immune responses in brain tumor defense.” (Bowles and Perkins, 1999, pp. 636-642) As a practicing neurosurgeon, Muizelaar was aware of this case history literature, his innovative treatment proposal having to be understood in this context rather than in the context of the sort of evidence issued from phased clinical trials.  The point of distinction of context is important because of the definitional approach taken by Ikemoto that moves in the latter context and thus with a view to “research” misconduct rather than what might otherwise be accounted an error in “clinical judgment.”  
In evaluating Muizelaar’s proposed treatment from a clinical perspective, it is important to understand that despite the available standard care options, there are “several determinants of resistance to this aggressive therapy,” making any available non-standard care innovative care all the more urgent, especially in the case of recurrent GBM. (Ohka, 2012)  As Ohka et al. report, “There is no consensus on the optimal approach for patients with recurrent GBM.” Said otherwise, “no consensus treatment option exists for patients with recurrent GBM…” It is known that patients having recurrent GBM, despite receiving combination therapy, face probability of therapy-resistant determinants, e.g., glioma-initiating cells.  “GSCs [glioma stem-like cells] have the ability to undergo self-renewal and initiate tumorigenesis.”  Moreover, “GSCs are resistant to a wide variety of chemotherapeutic agents and possess a remarkable ability to recover from cytotoxic therapy,” and they “play a role in RT [radiotherapy] failure, as tumors surviving RT are enriched in GSCs.” (Ohka, 2012) Okha et al. also note that, “The blood-brain barrier blocks most molecules that are larger than ~500Da,” in which case, “Many drugs are denied access to the very regions where they would be effective, thus limiting the clinical application of most anticancer drugs for treating brain tumors.”  These are important facts in the clinical context that makes treatment in recurrent GBM rather complex, as Muizelaar understood in deciding how he would manage the treatment of the three patients under his care.
Patyar et al. have commented on bacteria in cancer therapy as a novel experimental strategy, accounting for some reports in the literature that "some microorganisms display selective replication in tumor cells or preferential accumulation in the tumor micro-environment," hence the "potential for cancer therapy." (Puri, 1999) Such therapy counts as a type of immunotherapy: "Since tumors are immunogenic, the immunotherapeutic strategy employs stimulation of the immune system to destroy cancerous cells." The basic idea is to trigger an inflammatory reaction, thus "attract inflammatory cells i.e. neutrophils followed by monocyte[s] and lymphocytes.  The inflammatory reaction restricts the bacterial infection and directly contributes to the destruction of tumor cells through the production of reactive oxygen species, proteases, and other degradative enzymes.  And finally it stimulates a potent cellular immune response leading to destruction of residual tumor cells." (Puri, 1999, p. 5)
One example of an ongoing Phase 1 clinical trial for GBM and other malignant gliomas uses interleukin-13-Pseudomonas exotoxin.  In reviewing current trends related to treatment of GBM, Okha et al. commented about IL-13 research, noting that, “IL-13R is overexpressed in a majority of glioma cell lines and resected GBM specimens.”  Accordingly, several clinical trials account for this factor.  “A chimeric fusion protein composed of human IL-13 and mutated forms of Pseudomonas aeruginosa exotoxin A (PE38QQR) has been developed and shown to affect the specific cytotoxicity of glioma cell lines.”  Further, “IL-13-PE is reported to be more active against glioma cell lines than IL-4-targeted toxins in vitro.  In a phase I trial, 51 patients with GBM were administered IL-13-PE38QQR via CED.  A phase III study was conducted to compare the efficacy of IL-13-PE…” The authors concluded, “Overall, IL-13-based toxins can be potentially used in adjuvant therapy for malignant gliomas, but their use requires further clinical studies.” (Debinski, et al., 1995, pp. 1253-1258) An opportunistic pathogen, P. aeruginosa, via exotoxin A factor, has high cytotoxicity that targets cancer cells.  Such indications in bacterial pathogen research relate positively to Muizelaar’s interest in intracranial probiotic therapy as an innovative care option of last resort for patients having recurrent GBM and who have exhausted standard care treatment options.
Bohman, et al., (2009, pp. 828-835) considered the question of wound infection as “an unsubstantiated principle,” in relation to clinical data.  Examining a single-center cumulative experience with 382 patients in whom 18 bacterial infections were identified, the authors sought to measure survival differences. They observed that, “A moderate, statistically insignificant survival advantage was seen in the case group (Kaplan-Meier P=0.27),” adding further that, “However, when patients with infections in the first quarter and first half of the postoperative surgery were examined, this survival advantage disappeared.” (italics added)  The conclusion here is that, “postoperative infection did not confer any survival advantage in patients with glioblastoma multiforme”—“There was no significant survival difference in any subgroup analysed, including deep infections, bone flap infections, or infections caused by any specific organism.” (Bohman, et al., 2009) Given this report, it seems Muizelaar’s statement referencing the Bohman study is in error.  Even though he acknowledged the point of no statistical significance, he still claimed that the report can be considered “class 2 evidence in favour of wound infection in patients with malignant brain tumors.”
  DeBonis, et al. (2011, pp. 864-869) similarly engaged this question as “a prevalent myth,” noting that the claim is “based largely on anecdotal reports.” The clinical claim is that, “having an infection within or near the resection cavity after removal of a brain tumor can actually stimulate the immune function of the patient and promote a longer survival.” The authors cited anecdotal reports until 2009; only two cases involved GBM. The authors commented, “Survival was 8 years among patients with grade III gliomas; the 2 patients with GBM survived 5 and 10 years, thus suggesting a strong prognostic impact of infection on survival.” (DeBonis, 2011, pp. 864-869) Even though this is anecdotal for two patients only, this is an important claim, given the median survival of 15 months associated with GBM.  DeBonis, et al., referenced one single-center study that “showed there was no survival advantage in those patients who had glioblastoma with postoperative infection.”  Taking note of the Bohman study, they observed that, “subgroup analysis of patients with deep infections showed a trend toward longer survival” (italics added). Reporting on results of a study at their medical center, involving 197 patients, 10 of whom had postoperative bacterial infection, DeBonis et al. concluded that, “The infection group had a significant advantage in the median survival: 30 months (95% CI, 21-39) vs. 15 months (95% CI, 13-17) for patients without postoperative infection” (italics added).  That said, the authors cautioned, “The association between infection and prolonged survival is not definitive…” Given these published reports, Muizelaar had some evidence from the periodical literature to count in favor of his “last resort” approach to the treatment of his patients having GBM.
But, even then, accounting for the particulars of the clinical cases, one can ask, as oncologist Markman does, when it comes to trying out a novel antineoplastic treatment strategy in a desperate situation (i.e., situations in which “no standard therapy of known clinical utility is available”), who should decide? (Markman 2013) Assuming adequate informed consent of the patient who must likewise deliberate under the given circumstances of diagnosis and prognosis, Markman asks: “What is wrong with…[the] interpretation that it is the patient who has the ultimate authority to decide?”  Granted, Markman is not suggesting “physicians should encourage the use of completely unknown therapeutics…” He specifically means here, having “a rational basis, such as strong preclinical laboratory support of preliminary evidence of utility in an early phase clinical trial, and appears to be associated with acceptable risk—or at least a well-known toxicity profile based on prior clinical investigation.”  On such basis, Markman asks: “by what ethical authority does a physician have the right to answer ‘no’ [to the patient considering a novel antineoplastic strategy discussed with the attending physician]?”  Indeed, adds Markman, “And specifically in the cancer arena, where it has become remarkably common to see reports of novel strategies favourably impacting defined subsets of cancers in individual patients as having untreatable malignancies, how can we be so smug as to believe we know all the answers?”
Precisely this question must be asked in a case in which there is much confusion whether Muizelaar was engaged in human subjects research or proposing a novel antineoplastic strategy for patients in desperate straits.  Markman poses his question, but it is clear the answer is in the affirmative: “And in these situations, if the patient has been provided with sufficient information by the physician and others to fully understand the possible risks, including serious side effects that may remain quite undefined, why should it not be that individual who decides whether potential clinical benefit, no matter how uncertain this may be, can justify the risk?”  The point being made here is that the physician’s fidelity in the clinical setting is due to his patient first and foremost, generalizable knowledge from prospective randomized clinical trials being entirely secondary.  Anyone expecting or insisting that a physician surrender his obligations to a given patient in favour of a prospective clinical trial unfairly privileges the research enterprise over the physician’s immediate clinical responsibility (Freedman, 1992, pp. 231-234); and this is surely the case for anyone insisting that Muizelaar ought to have engaged in both pre-clinical animal model studies and a phase 1 clinical trial concerned with proof of concept, safety, and some evidence of efficacy.  The latter are in order only on the condition that the intent of his clinical intervention is research and not individualized medical care.  Yet, for the three patients the evidence under report points to Dr. Muizelaar’s intent of individualized medical care, not research.
Muizelaar reported on the situation of a patient under his care in 2008.  Ikemoto’s report makes it clear that the patient involved in the 2008 treatment decision “had already received surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation therapy and had a recurrence of…tumor.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 13) This patient consented to intentional wound infection with Enterobacter aerogenes, this particular treatment proposal having been reviewed and approved by a bioethics committee operating independently of the UCDMC IRB committees A and B.  It is important to understand that Muizelaar is not at this point in time understood by anyone involved in either research oversight or clinical peer review or clinical management to be engaged in a research activity, but instead quite clearly involved in medical care in the setting of the clinical encounter as he treated his terminally ill patient.  The time reference is essential from the perspective of a clinical judgment about what is medically indicated for a given patient.  As Jonsen puts it, “…the term ‘medically indicated’ describes what a sound clinical judgment determines to be physiologically and medically appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case.” (Jonsen, et al., 2010, p. 18)  This is not a matter of generalized research knowledge.
Despite GBM patients being designated terminally ill, especially in the case of tumor present after standard care options have been exhausted, it is salient that, “There is no standard clinical definition of terminal.” (Jonsen, et al., 2010, p. 21) If one takes Jonsen’s opinion here, “Diagnosis of a terminal condition should be based on medical evidence and clinical judgment that the condition is progressive, irreversible, and lethal.”  Patients suffering from GBM whose standard care options have failed to halt tumorigenesis surely satisfy this criterion, in which case non-standard innovative care may be a warranted option to be considered jointly by the attending physician and the patient.  Muizelaar understood innovative therapy to be “any treatment for which the efficacy has not yet been proven,” opining further that, “often innovative treatment occurs first and is then followed by a clinical trial to prove efficacy,” e.g., as was evident in Muizelaar’s “work in treating heavily ventilated brain injury patients…” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 42) Of course, as Kathryn Montgomery might put it with reference to the particulars of this case, “The sources of his authority were his very local knowledge, a particular and specifically embodied objectivity, and long clinical experience…” (Montgomery, 2006, p. 190) Muizelaar surely also has his “habits of thought” that include his reflections on his own clinical experiences as an attending neurosurgeon, in which case innovative therapy is understandably contextualized accordingly, even as Muizelaar was surely aware of the “radical uncertainty” associated with his proposal.  Clinical judgment involves inductive reasoning, with assessment of various probabilities as to efficacy of alternative treatment regimens, this assessment a function of the physician’s clinical judgment in his evaluation of the particulars.
Muizelaar and Schrot understood their proposed innovative therapy could be controversially construed as research, in which case they presented the case to the UCDMC Bioethics Consultation Committee (BCC). The BCC opined that the proposed procedure “may be seen as consistent with the customs and practices of medicine.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 13) In short, for this committee, the proposed medical intervention was permissibly to be classified as therapy and not research, even though the committee recommended IRB review for more extended oversight might be appropriate.  But, it was clear at the time that the UCDMC IRB committees had no oversight authority for innovative therapy delivered in the clinical setting.  The UCDMC BCC opinion is issued consistent with a standard concept of clinical research: “any clinical intervention involving human subjects, patients, or normal volunteers, performed in accordance with a protocol designed to yield generalizable scientific knowledge.” (Jonsen, et al., 2010, p. 204) Central to this concept are the two elements identified: (1) the presence of an approved protocol governing the research process, and (2) the explicit goal of generalizable knowledge from discovery in recruited research subjects as such.  Further, as Jonsen reminded in his discussion of innovative treatment, “New approaches to diagnosis and treatment are constantly evolving.  Some of these may be tested in formal research but many will be tried by individual physicians before any formal determination of this utility.” (Jonsen, et al., 2010, p. 206; italics added) Moreover, “Innovative treatment is not, as such, governed by the codes and regulations that govern research.”  Jonsen also distinguishes innovative treatment from investigational treatment, the latter term describing “forms of diagnosis and therapy that are under development and have not reached the stage where a formally designed clinical trial has demonstrated efficacy.” (Jonsen, et al., 2010, p. 206) These are important conceptual distinctions having operational implications, especially given the confusions in language among authorities at UCDMC.  Dr. Muizelaar was concerned to deliver an innovative treatment, not an investigational treatment in the above sense.
It is to be noted further that Dr. Schrot did consult with the FDA prior to treatment of the patient in 2008, explaining then that: “We are proposing an experimental protocol for a single patient…” The BCC used the term ‘experimental’ when giving its recommendation; but, we are informed, the BCC “did not intend any specific meaning” that would mark it as definitional in the context of human subjects research. (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 13) This is to be understood, therefore, as not suggesting Muizelaar and Schrot were involved in research but, simply, that the procedure envisioned counted as an experimental, i.e., non-standard, clinical procedure. It was at this time, however, that Muizelaar and Schrot submitted an application for IRB full committee review.  Their intent was to order the bacteria and initiate pre-clinical laboratory work.  Schrot stated in the application that, “Further pre-clinical work is needed before a larger scale trial is implimented [sic].”  In the case of this particular patient, Schrot argued that, (1) “the current observational and existing pre-clinical evidence supports a single therapeutic trial of probiotic intracranial therapy in an otherwise dismal prognosis for the patient in question,” and (2) “therapeutic innoculation [sic] of the tumor cavity with a known strain of Enterobacter aerogenes with antibiotic rescue offers a reasonable risk/benefit ratio in this patient.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 14)  It is important to note here that the assessment is utilitarian, involving assessment of risk and benefit to the patient to be sure of a net benefit before proceeding with the proposed intervention. The FDA consultation in this case issued an “advisory” with a condition that Muizelaar would have to meet if he were to proceed with a specific patient: “…if the product (bacteria) is available to you,” the FDA official recommended, “I suggest you proceed as under the strategy of innovative care rather than research…” This recommendation was determinative as a guideline in the clinical setting of Muizelaar and Schrot’s engagement of GBM patients—the proposal was reviewed and understood to be a strategy of innovative care and not biomedical research per se.  However, granted, the advisory opinion also stated the condition that, if the product (bacterium) to be used “is only available under IND [i.e., as an investigational drug], you would need to work through CBER [the FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research].” Because the bacteria were not locally available at the time, Muizelaar and Schrot abandoned the innovative care option and the patient died within months.  This case in 2008 provides important historical context to the deliberations in the subsequent situation of patient care.
At issue in the later cases of Patients 1 and 2 is (1) whether the two neurosurgeons were formally involved in human subjects research without having conducted preclinical (animal model) studies, and (2) the provenance of the bacteria, with the attribute “locally available” very much subject to interpretation and bearing upon whether FDA regulations were violated.  But, in any case, given the urgency of the medical intervention (in the case of Patients 1 and 2), it was understood that full committee review could be postponed, the proposal to be considered by committee only “for the purpose of additional potential patients.”  The consultation with CBER resulted in the statement that, “animal studies will be necessary prior to entering into the clinic with your proposed therapy,” this notice pointing to the need for preclinical studies to show “not only safety, but also establish a reasonable proof of concept in order for this investigational therapy to be introduced into patients.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 14) In this case, CBER determined, by way of this recommendation at least, that the procedure envisioned by Muizelaar and Schrot counted as an investigational therapy, an unfortunate term that only added to the conceptual ambiguity, since the presupposition seems to be that the bacteria to be used would then be construed as an IND.  In the case of Patient 2, IRB director Mah opined upon consultation: “If you choose to administer the locally-grown bacteria to this second patient in the course of your practice of medicine and in your best judgment as the patient’s treating physician, I would again obtain surgical consent from the subject and/or family…As with the first patient, I recommend you consult with Chief Medical Officer Al Siefkin prior to performing the procedure.” The decision-making context is clearly that of clinical judgment, with CMO oversight as part of medical staff peer review. (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 19) Thus, this is not at this point clinical research.  The IRB Chair understood that patient consent and CMO review/approval were sufficient to enable the attending physician’s introduction of the innovative strategy.  And, indeed, the evidence is that both conditions were satisfied.
In the 2008 case, the proposed use of the therapy was suspended, by mutual consultation of the UCDMC officials and the physicians, Dr. Schrot understanding then that the proposed use of E. aerogenes would constitute use of an ordered product counting as an IND under the FDA definition.  However, in response to the Ikemoto investigation, Schrot voiced his concern about an interpretive difficulty on this point:  “It is indisputable that the bacteria administered to the glioblastoma patients was obtained locally from the UC Davis laboratory, where it had been cultured for thousands of generations,” Schrot argued, taking issue with Ikemoto’s technical distinction of bacteria “locally available” and bacteria “locally derived.”  Muizelaar stated he was “unaware of any FDA regulations concerning the origination/designation of bacteria,” and that, further, in his view “bacteria transitions to ‘local’ status within ten generations, but such measurement is more dependent upon the local lab technician’s experience with the bacteria.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 42)  This technical distinction was by no means settled even as it was unclear by what authority the distinction was to be resolved and what difference it would make in the deliberation about innovative strategy vs. research.
Dr. Muizelaar clearly wanted “a controlled strain” of bacteria to be used, given the non-standard innovative use of E. aerogenes for intentional wound infection in Patients 1 and 2.  Muizelaar reported that the IRB director determined only subsequently that, “stock cultures of bacteria maintained in a local laboratory are not in fact a local product if the seed cultures come from the ATCC [American Type Culture Collection], even if the implanted product itself was grown, maintained, and developed locally.” (Muizelaar, 2013)  Muizelaar judged this requirement for definition of ‘locally available’ to be an “unprecedented” determination.  And, there is merit to his objection, given the variance in reasoning among the professionals consulted and the terms in use by them (including here: “locally available,” “locally derived,” “locally obtained”) and especially given the lack of specificity about this in either university policy or university regulation.  Thus, Dr. Schrot likewise objected to this distinction, given that apparently “the IRB had no obligation to inquire about this supposedly critical distinction,” and, further, given that “this supposedly critical distinction [is not] discerned in any UC Davis regulatory codes, much less the Faculty Code of Conduct,” and, moreover, “not even addressed by the FDA [italics added]”—an important point, given the UCDMC investigative appeal to the applicable federal regulatory context for adjudication of the case.
We are informed that a UCD microbiologist (Navarro) had “ordered the bacterial seeds from the ATCC, supervised culturing of the bacteria for thousands of generations, and authorized the release of the cultured bacteria from her lab for Dr. Muizelaar’s surgical use on each occasion.” (Schrot, 2013) Since (a) neither Muizelaar nor Schrot was a signatory to the Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) on the basis of which Navarro procured the bacteria, (b) derived bacteria would count as “progeny” under the MTA, and (c) the bacteria when ordered were “not intended for human use,” therefore procurement of the bacteria intended for wound infection from the Navarro lab would, of course, violate the MTA.  Yet, again, conceptual ambiguity here, along with the supposed authority Navarro had to handle the bacteria progeny in question, only added to the complexity of the need to differentiate between phased clinical trial research and innovative treatment, the latter properly subject to standards of clinical judgment.  Here again, as a matter of fact, Schrot and Navarro are the co-investigators in the preclinical studies, not Muizelaar, despite his consultations with Schrot in his clinical capacity as an attending neurosurgeon.
C. Procedural Ambiguity
  Professor Ikemoto reported that Schrot initiated animal (rats) model studies in 2008, this research protocol properly subject to Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) approval and oversight. (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 16) Schrot, as principal investigator, stated the object of that study to be “to demonstrate a therapeutic effect of intracranial infection with a gram-negative organism on a rat model of glioblastoma,” and, moreover, to “demonstrate a proof of principle that live bacteria can fight brain cancer.”  Thereby, Schrot sought to be research-compliant with the CBER directive after consultation in the case of the patient being treated in 2008.  Schrot understood this to be a preclinical investigation, “promising results” then to allow consideration of subsequent “FDA approved phase I clinical trials in humans…” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 16) Hence, the animal model studies pursued by Schrot in 2008 were preclinical research.  But, they are reasonably to be separated from either standard or non-standard innovative medical care of human patients suffering from recurrent GBM and being treated by Dr. Muizelaar as the attending physician of record.
Dr. Muizelaar stated the intention of his medical intervention in the case of Patient 1 under his care in October 2010, who was “dying with recurrent GBM originally diagnosed and operated elsewhere in a last ditch effort to save…life.” (Muizelaar, 2013) Muizelaar reported that, when contacted, IRB director Mah opined that the neurosurgeon’s proposed treatment “does not qualify as human subjects research,” and, furthermore, “the procedure does not appear to fall under the auspices of the FDA authority” because the case involves “a single patient in the course of clinical care and not as part of research…” This guidance clearly contributed to Dr. Muizelaar’s judgment that he may proceed with the proposed innovative strategy. Dr. Schrot explained the proposed procedure thus (this being the procedure to be used in Patient 1 and Patient 2 in particular): “We are not implanting an engineered strain of [E. aerogenes] bacteria. The surgery we are performing is otherwise routinely performed for recurrent glioblastoma. We are altering our technique in such a way that the wound becomes contaminated, both by introducing wild type [E. aerogenes] bacteria and by not giving pre-operative antibiotics.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 19; italics added) The relevant interpretation here is surgical intervention, not research (e.g., such as clearly would be the case if the bacteria involved were a recombinant/engineered strain), with therapeutic intent to provoke an immune response through inflammation at the wound site.  Given the opinion from the IRB director, Muizelaar “proceeded with implanting the bacteria as a means of inducing a potentially healing infection.”  Muizelaar’s understanding is here corroborated by Schrot, who insists that he and Muizelaar had “no intention of treating a large number of patients, and was only aware of a single patient at the time….” (Schrot, 2013) From the perspective of clinical ethics, these are pertinent facts to privilege the attending physician’s clinical judgment as entirely appropriate in the context of the clinical encounter, in which the non-standard innovative intervention is being proposed.  One cannot reasonably, thereafter, retrospectively identify this decision as part and parcel of a research activity without undermining the very meaning of clinical judgment that has standing with reference to a given patient.
In her report on her interview with IRB Director Mah, however, Ikemoto stated Mah did “not believe he was aware at that time [2010] of a prior request [in 2008] for approval of this treatment” or “that Dr. Schrot was conducting animal studies regarding the proposed procedure.”  Indeed, Ikemoto added, “Mr. Mah stated in his interview that had he been aware of the animal studies being conducted by Dr. Schrot and Dr. Muizelaar regarding this procedure, it would have changed his analysis regarding whether the procedure for this patient could be considered ‘research.’” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 37) However, it is unclear in what significant way Mah’s analysis would have changed, and whether it would have changed so as to object to or overrule the clinical decision taken by Muizelaar, assuming Mah was in a position as IRB director to take such a stand officially.  And, there is no reason presented to accept the assumption, given the separation of the research oversight process and the medical peer review process (the latter, e.g., subject to review and recommendation from the Chief Medical Officer at UCDMC).  The fact is that the neurosurgeons depended on the opinion Mah offered; and, as Ikemoto reports, Mah agreed with the proposed procedure “without IRB approval” being required because (1) “it counted as innovative care,” (2) “it was for a single patient,” and (3) “the surgeons believed it was in the best interest of the patient.”  In short, Mah recognized the validity of the clinical judgment in this case at this time.  Mah did not refer the matter to the chairs of the IRB committees A or B, which he could have done for any specialized consultation normally required.  Muizelaar, thus, acted within clinical reason, given the consultation and opinion rendered by the IRB director in this case, despite the incomplete information Mah had before him (i.e., his lack of recall concerning the request in the case of the patient being treated in 2008).
We know, then, that it was in 2008 that Dr. Schrot first sought FDA guidance in the proposed treatment (not research) of a patient under Muizelaar’s care.  The Provost’s Panel informs that, “The response of the FDA [in 2008] was that (1) the physicians could proceed with the intervention as ‘innovative treatment’ if the bacteria were available locally,” that (2) if the bacteria were not available locally and (3) available only as an IND, “then the physicians would have to consult with the CBER, which determined that animal studies would be required before proceeding with the use of the bacteria in humans.”   Given the three criteria identified by Mah, however, there was no change in the attending physician’s intention such that Dr. Muizelaar could be said to be engaged at the time in a systematic investigation of a hypothesis that would count as human subjects research and which would then, indeed, require “IRB review and an IND application to the FDA.”  The 2008 FDA advisory was a clear conditional proposition: Animal studies (i.e., pre-clinical “proof of concept” studies) were expected only in the case of Muizelaar using an IND product and not in the case of a locally available bacteria culture.  At the time, neither Muizelaar nor Schrot had reason to believe (a) they were using an IND product, (b) understood the bacteria used for wound infection to be locally available, and hence (c) had no institutionally specified requirement to conduct animal studies as a formal research activity subject to ethics committee review (including here the usual protocol review expected from an IACUC).  In short, in October 2010 Dr. Muizelaar was not engaged in human subjects research, despite Schrot’s animal (rat model) studies, and Dr. Muizelaar was clear in his intent as to the patient care he endeavoured to deliver based on his clinical judgment.  It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that treatment of Patient 1 should have been eliminated entirely from any investigative question concerning whether Muizelaar was engaged in human subjects research—and clearly, it was Schrot as a principal investigator (along with microbiologist Navarro) who was engaged in preclinical research, whatever the clinical trial prospects Dr. Schrot conceived at this time.
Of course, the reference to FDA authority here is important, given FDA’s definition of ‘drug’, which was cited by Ikemoto: “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” and “articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” [21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act § 201(g)(1)]  The point of this reference is that, as Ikemoto sought to make clear, “the definition of drug is not limited to compounds intended for therapeutic purposes; it also includes compounds intended to affect the structure or function of the body, without regard to whether the compound is intended to influence a disease process.”  In short, on this line of reasoning, introduction of bacteria into a surgical site such as Dr. Muizelaar proposed counts, under this FDA definition, as use of a “drug.”  Ikemoto, therefore, commented on the basis of the interview with Mah in the case of Patient No. 2, (1) “…the FDA issued new guidance after the procedure was conducted on Patient 1 that clarified that FDA considers the bacteria that Dr. Schrot and Dr. Muizelaar intended to use on Patient 2 to qualify as a drug;” and (2) the IRB director believed that, “FDA would consider this procedure using the bacteria to be subject to FDA regulation and authority.”  Whether Muizelaar’s procedure counts as one involving use of an IND, however, is problematic, given the FDA definition of IND as a “new drug or biological drug that is used [administered or dispensed] in a clinical investigation.” (italics added)  The FDA recognizes what is called “an Emergency Use IND” that “allows the FDA to authorize use of an experimental drug in an emergency situation that does not allow time for submission of an IND in accordance with 21 C.F.R. sections 312.23 or 312.34.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 6) Given that Muizelaar, including the IRB director, (1) did not construe the procedure as research, (2) the emergency use IND category is to be used in the case of “patients who do not meet the criteria of an existing study protocol, or if an approved study protocol does not exist,” and (3) neither Muizelaar nor Schrot was involved in human subjects research governed by an existing study protocol nor involved with a human subjects research proposal with a protocol pending IRB review and approval, it is reasonable to conclude that the innovative care procedure the two neurosurgeons proposed could not reasonably have counted as an experimental drug requiring emergency use authorization under FDA IND rules. (Holbein et al., 2009; FDA, no date) 
The alternative within FDA oversight is the category of “Treatment IND,” which concerns an application “submitted for experimental drugs showing promise in clinical testing for serious or immediately life-threatening conditions while the final clinical work is conducted and the FDA review takes place.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 6) But, clearly, this category also does not apply to Dr. Muizelaar’s procedure, since (1) “For serious diseases, applications for Treatment INDs must show sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the use,” and (2) the procedure Muizelaar implemented was not part of a systematic investigation (clinical trial) designed to show either safety or effectiveness. The context of the FDA criteria is such as to make it clear it denotes “a drug…made available for treatment use either during Phase 3 investigations or after all clinical trials have been completed.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 6)  As a matter of fact, Dr. Muizelaar was not conducting a phased clinical trial in any sense of the word; and, clearly, he was not treating a patient with a procedure that had been validated to the degree required of a phase 3 clinical trial.  One concludes, then, that the two neurosurgeons could not be held accountable to this IND standard in evaluating the merit of their proposed medical intervention for Patient 2 in the clinical setting.
Whether his opinion at the time or a view he held only in retrospect, Mah believed that Muizelaar’s proposed treatment “had the appearance of research with a vulnerable patient population,” thereby recommending—but not requiring—IRB review at the time.  It is problematic here that there was no definitive determination made so as to adjudicate whether this was in fact a problem of research on a vulnerable population.  What counts as a vulnerable population is itself unclear in this clinical setting, where Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot engage a series of patients (only three in number, engaged consecutively) merely as a matter of these patients presenting (at the hospital or clinic) for neurosurgical medical care for GBM (recurrent GBM in Patients 1 and 2), rather than these patients being actively “recruited” for a preconceived protocol-approved systematic study that indeed would constitute research and have the assortment of regulations applicable that normally assure research integrity.  Mah’s recommendation included a supplemental recommendation that the Chief Medical Officer be consulted before the procedure.  This fact means that thereby he left the matter to the discretion of the neurosurgeons as a matter of clinical judgment, which stands in contrast to a definitive policy or regulatory oversight directive with which the two clinicians should clearly comply if they were determinately involved in human subjects research.
Indeed, Ikemoto’s report pointed to on-going ambiguity about the role of the IRB (and more specifically, the IRB director) in relation to the clinical setting of inpatient care, since Mah opined, “He was not in a position to tell doctors how to treat their patients; rather, he believes he had a duty to inform them of the rules.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 39) But, the rules that concern Mah are those of human subjects research, not rules governing clinical practices in which standards of clinical judgment are reasonably engaged. The ambiguity about rules clearly carried over into the IRB director’s misconception about the purpose of presentations at “Grand Rounds” at UCDMC when Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot decided to discuss the innovative care procedure among clinical colleagues: Mah “viewed this as potentially problematic because if one is presenting on a subject it could be argued that you are contributing to ‘generalizable knowledge’ (a factor when considering whether something is research).”  But, here the conditional proposition is entirely problematic for being spurious:  Presentations in clinical rounds concern specific patient case review with colleagues who can engage a case with a view to the clinical adequacy of medical interventions, accounting for whatever evidence-based reasoning contributes to clinical judgment about proposed medical interventions in relation to medical indications identifiable to a given patient.  Since Dr. Muizelaar did not construe treatment of Patient No. 2 as research, and the treatment was indeed construed as innovative therapy even by the IRB director, it is fallacious to conclude either that (a) the presentation of the case in clinical rounds constituted a contribution to “generalizable knowledge” or (b) this was in and of itself evidence of human subjects research.  Dr. Robert O'Donnell, the head of oncology at UCDMC, himself was unfamiliar with the concept of "innovative use," although he was aware of the concept of "compassionate use." (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 45) O'Donnell's claim that, "Had he been consulted, he would have made other suggestions for the proposed treatment, such as autoclaving" implies that he understood the procedure to be a "compassionate use" option, whatever the debate at the time (2008, 2010, 2011) about whether the proposed intervention in each case constituted research or innovative therapy.
Since IRB director Mah recommended consultation with Chief Medical Officer Dr. Alan Siefkin, the interview statement from Ikemoto’s report is pertinent in judging how the CMO’s opinion affected the clinical judgments of Muizelaar and Schrot.  Dr. Siefkin was less concerned about the clinical validity of the proposed procedure or that it was non-standard innovative care, and was focused instead on the matter of informed consent and “complications of treatment,” which is why he contributed accordingly to revisions to the informed consent document.  As far as the CMO was concerned, the two physicians could proceed with the proposed therapy as long as patient consent was in order.  There is nothing here to suggest that the CMO considered the two neurosurgeons engaged in research during the treatment of Patients 1 and 2. (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 51 ff.) (It was only after being informed about Patient 3 that the CMO directed Muizelaar to “cease and desist” from continued use of the procedure.)  In fact, it is important to any official judgment of misconduct of Muizelaar as attending neurosurgeon that the CMO “believed Dr. Muizelaar and Dr. Schrot had good intentions and that they believed they had permission from [the] CMO and IRB—he did not believe they were being dishonest.”  Given this assessment from the CMO, who has oversight authority as a physician-executive in the clinical setting of hospital clinical/medical practitioner operations, Dr. Muizelaar was being beneficent within the scope of his clinical responsibilities (including here “compassionate use” care), having done a benefit/risk assessment as part of assuring informed consent in his patients, and there is no basis to judge him deficient in terms of his duties of non-maleficence or beneficence in the case of Patients 1 and 2.
It is only with the proposed procedure being carried out in the case of Patient 3 that the issues become more controversial in terms of the regulatory oversight that seemed applicable at this point, a claim of oversight that concerns the adequacy of Dr. Muizelaar’s clinical judgment.  Here a medical staff peer review process may fault Muizelaar in his clinical judgment, since it seems he did not procee with standard care options for Patient 3 first; GBM was apparently a new diagnosis for this particular patient.  As has been clear from the foregoing discussion, innovative therapy would normally be a defensible (albeit defeasible) option only in the case of GBM recurrent after standard care options had been exhausted and lacking expected efficacy.  That said, however, we are not informed as to the details of clinical assessment for Patient 3 and whether this particular patient preferred not to undergo the standard care options of radiotherapy and chemotherapy.   This is an important assessment in light of the fact that the Patient 3 informed consent form states: "We understand that this treatment option is not currently part of a clinical trial, and that this treatment method has not been subject to FDA approval or IRB review, but represents the best clinical judgment of Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot, who are solely responsible for its use in this particular case.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 22; italics added) Patient 3 consented, received the innovative treatment, but died two weeks after surgery, autopsy reporting glioblastoma, meningitis, and anoxic changes. (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 27) The cease and desist order from the CMO was issued only after Patient 3 was treated with the procedure.  But, even then, it is pertinent that, in response to investigative questions, the CMO characterized Dr. Muizelaar as “transparent to a fault,” in which case he had no reason to doubt Muizelaar in his belief in his approach to treatment in the case of the patients suffering from recurrent GBM even as he did not doubt Dr. Muizelaar’s clinical performance vis-à-vis his obligations of non-maleficence and beneficence. (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 52) 
D. Research vs. Innovative Care: Professor Ikemoto’s Opinion
	Ayadhy and Razack opine that, “Innovative therapy represents a justifiable departure from inferior conventional therapy in the absence of an accepted standard therapy. Innovation shares with research its experimental nature, but differs from research in its goal and context that exempts innovative therapy from direct governance by [a] research ethics board.” (Eyadhy, et al., 2008; italics added) This opinion, they point out, is consistent with Paragraph 32 [Paragraph 35 in the 2008 revision] of the Helsinki Declaration that, “In the treatment of a patient, where proven…therapeutic methods do not exist or have been ineffective, the physician, with informed consent from the patient, must be free to use unproven or new therapeutic measures, if in the physician’s judgment it offers hope of saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating suffering.” (World Medical Association, 2000) Thus, as Agich puts it, “Such statements appropriately point to a land outside the pale of REP [the regulatory ethics paradigm]. This borderland, however, is largely underdeveloped regarding the procedures and standards that should apply. Given the widespread acceptance of REP, bioethicists have not been inclined to examine closely the actual processes by which clinical innovations are developed and the initial conditions prerequisite for the application of the paradigm. This omission is important, because it has permitted the extension of REP into the domain of clinical innovation without an adequate assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of such an expansion.” (Agich, 2001, pp. 295-296) Indeed, adds Agich, “The complex processes characteristic of clinical innovation are often not reducible to a scientific protocol.”  It is this REP perspective, I submit, that was problematically emphasized in the Muizelaar investigation at UCDMC, to the detriment of defensible clinical judgment relative to innovative therapy (assuming a reliable medical peer review process governing clinical practice at the medical center).
In the section of her report concerned with this dichotomy of research and innovative care, Professor Ikemoto took issue with Muizelaar’s citation of a scholarly article by John Lantos.  Citing the Belmont Report criteria, Ikemoto allowed that UCD has the institutional authority “to determine under what circumstances, if any, the [innovative care treatment] procedure can be used at the institution.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p. 70) But, Ikemoto failed to account for the Belmont Declaration’s statement that, “When a clinician departs in a significant way from standard or accepted practice, the innovation does not, in and of itself, constitute research.  The fact that a procedure is experimental in the sense of new, untested, or different does not automatically place it in the category of research….” (National Commission, 1979) Ikemoto identified the bacteria used in Muizelaar’s procedure as an IND, on the basis of a “broad definition” stated in the UCD PPM, Chapter 240, and on that basis characterized the procedure as research rather than as innovative therapy. Yet, for Patients 1 and 2 it was understood that the neurosurgeons had pertinent consultations with authorities that allowed them to proceed on the basis of a claim of innovative care.  Specifically, Ikemoto argued, Muizelaar’s “intentional wound procedure” counted as a “surgical procedure” that “is considered to involve research” on condition that (1) the “investigator wishes to develop a procedure that has not previously been performed” or (2) if “[the investigator] wishes to study a procedure that is not accepted therapy or that might not be considered ‘best medical care.’”
It is entirely problematic here, however, that Ikemoto construes either Dr. Muizelaar or Dr. Schrot in this clinical setting of concern as an “investigator” in the normal use of that term, even granting that Muizelaar’s proposal for intentional wound infection is different from, and refers to results of studies in, the neurological medicine literature involving non-intentional postoperative infection in GBM patients.  In the case of Patients 1 and 2, no one doubted the grave “terminal” status of the patients and the lack of standard care options (apparently different in the case of Patient 3, although the clinical details are not available). And, indeed, no one was in doubt as to the “vulnerability” of the patients and their families with regard to the complex decision involved in a reasonably last resort situation of medical intervention.  Any clinician viewing the case of Patient 3 may well reasonably disagree in clinical judgment whether intentional wound infection constitutes “best medical care” under the circumstances; and, indeed, we know that the CMO had himself preferred that Muizelaar not introduce the procedure in the case of Patient 3.  In the absence of our involvement assessing the clinical complexities of the particular case, however, we are not in a position to assess either the "degree of burden" associated with the standard care options or the "prospects of benefit" from standard or non-standard innovative care and the relation between the two as Patient 3 deliberated about therapeutic options, knowing only the probability of median survival in prognosis. Only after a directive such as the cease and desist order given by the CMO does it make sense to say that Muizelaar acted unreasonably in using the procedure in Patient 3; since, prior to this explicit directive Dr. Muizelaar is reasonably allowed to follow his clinical judgment as attending physician, this clinical judgment subject to his assessment of on-going consultation and consent from the patient and family involved in the medical care decisions, as well as what is permissible according to the institutional medical staff peer review process and the CMO’s prior involvement in assuring the adequacy of the patient informed consent forms.
	Professor Ikemoto, of course, raised the additional point that “the FDA [had] specifically advised Dr. Schrot that ‘proof of concept’ was required before the procedure could be conducted in humans,” meaning here the need for pre-clinical (animal model) studies.  In short, Ikemoto reasoned that once this FDA advisory was given (in 2008), Muizelaar and Schrot’s “procedure” was thereby to be considered research rather than non-standard innovative care being delivered to a given patient.  Yet, the CMO opined on interview, (A) “we believe that all of these surgical cases were physician-driven efforts to prolong the patients’ lives,” that (B) “These surgical cases involved the use of an unmarketed biologic and did not constitute ‘research’,” and that, (C) “therefore [1] this did not fit squarely within then-existing policies and procedures governing human subject research and [2] did not involve the delivery of investigational drugs or devices into the surgical setting.” (Ikemoto, 2013, p 71) This is a clear clinical and administrative opinion that is very weighty in assessing not only the intent of Muizelaar and Schrot, but also in assessing the validity of their claim that they were engaged in innovative therapy as a last resort option.  While there remains disagreement whether either IRB approval or medical staff approval or both was required for Patients 2 and 3, this statement from the CMO is more exculpatory than convicting of Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot of professional (research) misconduct.  The fact is that Ikemoto privileged the UCD Policy and Procedure Manual’s broader definition of ‘research’ over the FDA definition.  This was a tendentious interpretive stance, applied retroactively, having warrant as a consequence only of investigative hindsight; but, in the immediacy of the clinicians’ decisional context, all official administrative advisories were given with reference to the FDA definition, which was controlling for the purpose of clinical judgment and which should have remained controlling for the purpose of adjudicating the question of Dr. Muizelaar’s alleged professional misconduct.
In his statement in response to Ikemoto, Dr. Muizelaar objected: “If Professor Ikemoto’s assumptions and findings were to guide medical treatment policy in the future, terminal patients with no hope of recovery will have only the option of hospice and death available to them.  Innovative care will be mired in committee reviews and delays while the patients die.”  The point here cannot be gainsaid in the context of urgent medical care where patient vulnerability merges readily with impending mortality because of the lack of efficacious standard care options and especially grave medical conditions such as GBM.
Conclusions: Vulnerability in the Clinical Encounter
	It is fundamentally problematic in this case that the investigations internal to UCDMC were concerned about procedural “research” failures on the part of the two neurosurgeons.  The investigative focus on policy and regulation associated with human subjects research predisposed the investigators hermeneutically to ignore an equally important feature of vulnerability in the clinical encounter, such as has been engaged by the phenomenological philosopher and clinical ethicist, Richard Zaner. (Zaner, 2003, pp. 283-294) Research ethics, and academic bioethics in general, have to be distinguished from clinical ethics insofar as the latter has a unique practice associated with the clinical encounter, in which case evaluation of clinician conduct is more properly addressed by clinical ethicists working in the context of an institutional clinical consultation service rather than by academic bioethicists who have no first-hand experience with the clinical context of medical care—even one such as Professor Ikemoto whose area of expertise is clearly not that of clinical ethics.  A proper review of the Muizelaar/Schrot “case” would have benefitted immensely from an assessment that accounts for insights, such as those of Zaner, into the phenomenology of medical practice, on the basis of which Zaner understands and describes both the complexity and uncertainty associated with the clinical encounter.  Here I wish to engage some of Zaner’s insights as they relate to the complexity of the clinical issues Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot engaged in clearly dire cases of GBM.
	Zaner is clear that any clinical encounter involves a physician-patient relationship that structures an asymmetry of power (on the part of the clinician) and vulnerability (of the patient and family).    The physician’s power/authority is both “epistemic” and “therapeutic,” insofar as he or she presents himself or herself as one having the knowledge to heal.  This is so even if the patient is not specifically categorized by some prior taxonomy as a member of a vulnerable population, who thereby merits special consideration according to standards of research ethics.  If there is any patient who qualifies as being "at the edge of mortality," to use a phrase from Zaner, it is the patient having GBM; whose prognosis makes starkly clear (a) the vulnerability associated with this disease to the point of imminent mortality, and (b) the peculiar complexity involved in any physician's and patient’s deliberation about either standard medical care or non-standard innovative care such as Muizelaar insists he pursued. (Zaner, 2003, p. 200).  In this case, as with many others, there are no “clear givens” for the physicians, only “numerous probables, along with some range of uncertainty and ambiguity,” as Zaner would say. (Zaner, 2003, p. 15) This is the essential decisional context of medical intervention that is wholly absent from Ikemoto’s formal-legal analysis.  In situations of medical complexity and uncertainty, the physician’s clinical judgment is central to any evaluation about what is ethically required or ethically permissible by appeal to principles such as beneficence and non-maleficence, even as what counts as beneficent care can have varied interpretation relative to inductively warranted claims about medical indications and patient preferences.  More important here, however, is the preference in medical care given by the patient and family, despite the patient’s vulnerability in decision-making that is due to the dire prognosis.
	Zaner’s phenomenological approach to the clinical encounter points to what he calls “the heterogeneity of moral belief” that is unavoidable in the clinical setting—a plurality of points of view such that each could be internally coherent but which are rival to each other in the deliberative context; in which case, e.g., a research ethics and a clinical ethics could both be present, each being equally valid on the basis of internally coherent reasoning, yet both be contraposed in recommendations that pertain to the physician-patient relationship in a given clinical case.  Such seems to be the case with the Muizelaar/Schrot ethical dilemma as they moved forward with what they construed as innovative care while others interpreted their actions as biomedical research.  The opinion of the CMO, despite his unhappiness with the use of the innovative procedure in Patient 3 (his unhappiness being quite different from an administrative directive to cease and desist), makes it clear he understood the complexity of both the technical and the ethical judgments that Muizelaar faced, and the compounded uncertainty that is necessarily present in the implementation of those judgments.  In the absence of a patient “recruited” into a bone fide “phased clinical trial” such as is understood in research ethics, the approach of the physician is that of the clinician engaged in either standard medical care (e.g., surgery, then radiation and chemotherapy for GBM) or non-standard innovative care (e.g., the introduction of bacteria into the surgical site to generate an immune response and assist in suppression of tumorigenesis).  When the setting is the clinical encounter per se, then the reasoning associated with clinical ethics may, in fact, be incommensurable with the reasoning associated with research ethics.  Indeed, the public record associated with the Muizelaar case suggests this to be highly probable, despite lack of public access to the clinical records of Patients 1, 2, and 3 and the evaluations undertaken in the medical peer review (including the presentation of case in Grand Rounds).
Zaner’s reference to the ethical-theoretical work of moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, according to which a given concept of justice relates to a given context of practical rationality, is pertinent to this distinction:
Even if we suppose that each moral viewpoint has been well formulated, we merely discover that it is rivaled by other, also well-formulated viewpoints.  At no point, however, do we discover any culturally acceptable or logically compelling ways by which to weigh and consider the rival claims made on us by each of them.  Even more, the very fact of this heterogeneity serves to present us with an absurd issue: Does being a “moral” person require that one has to choose among the rivaling points of view?  Are these views in fact alternatives? (Zaner, 2003, p. 17)

Indeed, one can ask here, similarly: Does being accounted a morally praiseworthy physician require that Muizelaar choose among the rivaling points of view, especially if these points of view are not, in fact, alternatives but are instead incommensurable points of view given their different, albeit internally consistent, lines of reasoning?  The answer in this case seems to be most probably in the negative, given the primacy of Muizelaar’s clinical judgment in the physician-patient relationship (even allowing here for the medical staff peer review process at UCDMC, the deliberations of which remain undisclosed as a matter of state law).  The fact is that the IRB director was not “morally neutral,” even as he had the prejudice in understanding (which is by no means to say “deficient”) that issued from his responsibility for human subjects research—he was not informed in his deliberations in any way by the essentials of clinical ethics or clinical practice such as involves a physician’s clinical judgment in relation to the patient/family’s prior explicit and informed consent—despite whatever may be said about the patient’s/family’s “vulnerability”  as they decide in view of nigh imminent mortality.  In the setting of the clinical encounter, the principal question is, as Zaner puts it: “What are the patient’s best interests, and who is to decide that?” (Zaner, 2003, p. 19) 
	As Zaner’s point here makes clear, different points of view privilege different answers—Mr. Mah as IRB director; Dr. Siefkin as CMO; Dr. Muizelaar as attending physician/neurosurgeon; Patients 1, 2, and 3 taken individually; Ikemoto as lawyer/bioethicist deciding whether research (in contrast to clinical) misconduct occurred—in which case: “Thus, to decide that one of them should decide what the best interests are, is in fact to decide for one, as opposed to another, point of view.  But if, as was argued, the heterogeneity of moral viewpoints cannot coherently be taken as presenting moral agents with choice, then neither is the question, Who should decide? coherent.”  And, what this means further, says Zaner, is that “Frustration, dismay, possibly even power plays over decisions, then, seem the texture of moral life, especially in the context of clinical situations.” (Zaner, 2003, p. 19) Frustration (on the part of the neurosurgeons); dismay (on the part of the CMO after Patient 3 was treated); power play (between the IRB director concerned about human subjects research oversight and Muizelaar/Schrot concerned about medical care)—all were present in the case of decision-making about “the best interests” of Patients 1, 2, and 3.  Yet, the UCDMC internal investigation privileged the research ethics point of view, to the detriment of the clinical ethics point of view that is arguably more appropriate to the facts at hand, as argued here.
	Since UCDMC eventually moved to formulate and implement an innovative care policy, whatever the conclusion of the internal investigations in this case, we should be clear that the assortment of policies, regulations, rules, and procedures internal and external to this institution added to the significant moral complexity that overwhelmed both the technical and moral judgments of all parties involved.  At issue here was not some ideal physician-patient relationship that involves only Patients 1, 2, or 3 in a setting of clinical care where Dr. Muizelaar functions as attending physician as an isolated clinician.  Rather, as Zaner makes clear: “…patients (families, friends) are affected by the presence of health professionals, by the institutions of practice, by the rules and regulations governing that practice, as well as by the social, religious, and other types of value.  It thus remains to be determined in each case just which levels and kinds of moral issues are presented in each case, and how they impact the variety of decisions that are to be made at each stage of an illness or injury.” (Zaner, 2003, p. 20)
Yet, even accounting for this institutional complexity in its bearing upon moral decision concerning Patients 1, 2, and 3, and in particular settling on some locus of decision-making authority, we are left with the usual reference to the standard of the attending physician’s “reasonable medical judgment.”  As Zaner notes, we expect this to be based on a “medically beneficial standard” that eschews all maleficent intent, mere self-interest, and negligence.  And, in the cases of Patients 1 and 2, both of whom were in the dire predicament of no remaining standard care option, and even accounting for Patient 3, all were faced with the question whether to proceed with an innovative care option, itself grounded in Dr. Muizelaar’s medical (clinical) beneficence (seeking to prolong life) despite the uncertainty of outcome.  Professor Ikemoto’s analysis was restricted to the level of institutional rules and regulations governing biomedical research, diminishing thereby the place of clinical ethics and clinical judgment as they bear upon “the real, clinical demands” involving Patients 1, 2, and 3.  Her analysis also ignored the rightful place of patient deliberation and consent to the innovative procedure proposed, despite a questionable research ethics perspective of “vulnerable” status that was of concern to IRB Director Mah.  This institutional approach unfairly delegitimized the clinician’s unique therapeutic role in the clinical encounter, where the patient is indeed a patient first and foremost and not a research subject, despite what an external observer of the scene (such as Mah or Ikemoto) may perceive in trying to apply abstract rules to the circumstances of the given patients.  Ethicist Barry Gustin stated the point clearly: "...policy standards can never supersede the physician's clinical judgement which must be taken as the final word in making patient care decisions. This is because of the immense number of clinical variables and continually changing circumstances in both stable and unstable patients with complex multifactorial systemic medical problems." (Gustin, no date)
	Zaner similarly cites E.J. Cassell’s opinion that, “what distinguishes medicine from most other professions is the ‘constant possibility of error, and thus of doing terrible harm to someone’” such that “the physician must keep a centering question constantly alive: ‘What if I am wrong?’”  Accordingly, writes Zaner, “an ethics responsive to clinical medicine must be an ethics of uncertainty.” (Zaner, 2003, p. 312) There is no algorithm that is to be deployed in the clinical setting so as to achieve certainty of medical intervention, not even in the rarest of occasions.  As Montgomery states the point further, “Physicians strive to be as rational as possible, and clinical epidemiology and evidence-based medicine have raised the bar substantially…Physicians observe, generate and test hypotheses, eliminate the illogical and ill fitting, and verify what they can…Never mind…that clinical reasoning is always contextual, necessarily interpretive, and thus always to some degree provisional….” (Montgomery, 2006, p. 192)
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^1	  It is noteworthy by comparison to UCDMC that the Partners Human Research Committee (IRB) operating for Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital (Boston) locates innovative care intermediate between standard clinical care and formal research, that they permit (according to procedural review) innovative procedure for up to three patients, yet their mechanism is intended to provide only limited peer review for innovative approaches to unusual clinical situations. See here: http://healthcare.partners.org/phsirb/inntherp.htm. 
